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BhikΣuṇ¥ Íailå’s Rebuttal of
Måra’s Substantialist View:
The Chariot Simile in a SËtra Quotation
in the Abhidharmakoßopåyikå-†¥kå
Bhikkhun¥ Dhammadinnå
The first occurrence in Buddhist literature of an illustrative
simile comparing the five aggregates (Sanskrit skandhas/Pali
khandhas) to a chariot (ratha) is found in an early discourse
attested in different parallel versions. These are located in the Pali
Saµyutta-nikåya (SN 5.10), in two Saµyukta-ågama collections
extant in Chinese translation (SÓ 1202 and SÓ2 218) and, as a full
sËtra quotation, in the Tibetan translation of Íamathadeva’s
Abhidharmakoßopåyikå-†¥kå (Up 9014), a comprehensive repertory
of
the
canonical citations
given
in
Vasubandhu’s
AbhidharmakoßabhåΣya.
The discourse records an exchange between the celestial
being Måra and a fully awakened female disciple of the Buddha, a
bhikΣuˆ¥, whose name is Íailå in the version I translate in full from
Tibetan below (her name is also given as Íailå in the Chinese
versions but instead as Vajirå in the Pali version). Måra manifests
himself in the form of a young man and approaches the awakened
nun to challenge her with a doctrinal provocation, putting forward
the notion of a (living or sentient) ‘being’ conceived of as an
ontologically laden entity. The nun denies that such a being – thus
conceived – actually exists and drives her point home with the help
of an illustration that involves a chariot. Once she has set him
straight, Måra becomes dejected, vanishes, and is seen no more.
In what follows I first introduce and translate the full
quotation of the discourse in the Abhidharmakoßopåyikå-†¥kå,
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which is the only version so far untranslated into a European
language, and then I comment on this initial formulation of the
chariot simile in light of the ancient Indian background against
which the early Buddhist texts and teachings emerged. The
implications of the distinctive Buddhist use of the chariot imagery
in this context appears to me to be less to the forefront in
subsequent uses of the simile in later Buddhist tradition, which
tend to shift focus on intra-Buddhist scholastic preoccupations and
debates concerning the ontological standing of the person or
sentient beings in general.
The SËtra Quotation in the Abhidharmakoßopåyikå-†¥kå (Up 9014)
Íamathadeva’s Abhidharmakoßopåyikå-†¥kå follows a
characteristic procedure that consists in taking its cue from a
canonical citation given in Vasubandhu’s AbhidharmakoßabhåΣya,
usually reproducing it in full, and giving the corresponding
canonical passage in complete form or even supplying the whole
text to which the original citation belongs. In this way the
Abhidharmakoßopåyikå-†¥kå systematically supplements the
canonical material cited in the AbhidharmakoßabhåΣya, taking up
in sequence, one after the other, chapter by chapter, the canonical
citations incorporated in the flow of Vasubandhu’s treatise. In this
case, rather than supplying a full citation of the lengthy discourse
citation featured by the AbhidharmakoßabhåΣya (which comprises
all three verses that are spoken by the bhikΣuˆ¥ in the discourse),
the Abhidharmakoßopåyikå-†¥kå only cites an introductory
statement given in the AbhidharmakoßabhåΣya to the effect that
“The arhat¥ Íailå addressed Måra beginning with …” and then
quotes the actual discourse in its entirety (Up 9014).
This quotation (Up 9014), like all other discourse
quotations in the Abhidharmakoßopåyikå-†¥kå, stems from a
MËlasarvåstivåda lineage of transmission. It is thus a close parallel
to the version transmitted in the BhikΣuˆ¥-saµyukta of the
MËlasarvåstivåda Saµyukta-ågama extant in Chinese translation
(SÓ 1202 in T 99). 1 As a general pattern, the MËlasarvåstivåda
textual traditions underlying the Abhidharmakoßopåyikå-†¥kå and
the complete Chinese Saµyukta-ågama are closely related but not
1

SÓ 1202 at T II 327a19–b17 (translated in Anålayo 2015 [2014]: 125–126).
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identical, 2 a pattern also evident in the present case. These two
MËlasarvåstivåda discourses have a further parallel in the
BhikΣuˆ¥-saµyukta of the shorter Chinese translation of another
Saµyukta-ågama collection of disputed school affiliation (SÓ2 218
in T 100), a partial collection whose rapport with the MËlasarvåstivåda Saµyukta-ågama in particular continues to be a matter
of debate.3 Thus a triangulation between these three versions in my
annotation to the translation may offer a small contribution to
further exploration of the relationship between these collections,
with the Abhidharmakoßopåyikå-†¥kå and the MËlasarvåstivåda
Saµyukta-ågama remaining closer to each other compared to the
shorter Saµyukta-ågama. A fourth and last parallel is located in in
the Bhikkhun¥-saµyutta of the Sagåtha-vagga division of
Saµyutta-nikåya (SN 5.10).4
As briefly mentioned above, some confusion concerning
the name of the protagonist of the discourse has taken place in the
transmission of the text: the speaker in the Saµyutta-nikåya is the
nun Vajirå, whereas Abhidharmakoßopåyikå-†¥kå and the two
Saµyukta-ågamas have the nun Íailå as their protagonist. 5 The
MËlasarvåstivåda Saµyukta-ågama represents her name by means
of a phonetic rendering, 尸羅, and the shorter Saµyukta-ågama by
means of a translation, 石室, for Sanskrit/Pali ßaila-/sela- ‘rock’,
‘cliff’. This nun, Selå in Pali, is the protagonist of the preceding
discourse in the Bhikkhun¥-saµyutta, 6 whose text corresponds to
what in the two Saµyukta-ågamas is a teaching spoken by the nun
V¥r(y)å.7
2

See in more detail Anålayo 2019a and 2020b and Dhammadinnå 2020.
SÓ2 218 at T II 454c14–455a7 (translated in Bingenheimer 2008: 17–18 and
2011: 170–171). The affiliation of T 100 has recently been discussed by
Bingenheimer 2011: 23–50 (including a summary of relevant Japanese
scholarship), Karashima 2020 and again Bingenheimer 2020: 824–832.
4
SN 5.10 (Vajirå-sutta) at SN I 296,1–297,12 (translated in Bodhi 2000: 229–
230). In passing, as the doctrinal content of this and other discourses
collected in the Sagåtha-vagga illustrate, the appraisal by von Hinüber
2020: 7 that “the first of the five vaggas [of the Saµyutta-nikåya = the
Sagåtha-vagga] does not contain much material really relevant to Buddhist
teachings” is unjustified.
5
SÓ 1202 at T II 327a20f and SÓ2 218 at T 454c15f; cf. Bingenheimer 2011: 156.
6
SN 5.9 (Selå-sutta) at SN I 294,11–295,21.
7
On the confusion of names see Bingenheimer 2008: 8–10 and 2011: 156–159
and Anålayo 2015 [2014]: 214 note 29 and 216 note 31.

3
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Interestingly, a quotation of the verse with the chariot
illustration of this discourse found in the Pali Milindapañha agrees
with the Saµyutta-nikåya version in attributing the verses to Vajirå
(moreover, the Milindapañha records that the verse was spoken to
the Buddha, not to Måra).8 This makes it somewhat less probable
that the Milindapañha, a work of debated school affiliation, should
be of Sarvåstivåda (or MËlasarvåstivåda) origins, as in such a case
it would be more natural for it to agree with the Sarvåstivåda or
MËlasarvåstivåda traditions. 9 A parallel quotation of the verse
found in the complete Chinese translation of a counterpart to the
Pali Milindapañha (Naxian biqiu jing 那先比丘經), also of uncertain
school affiliation, does not supply the name of the nun protagonist
of the discourse and it generically attributes the citation to an
unnamed text or discourse. 10 In any case, agreement or
disagreement in matters of proper names is not a strong argument
to identify lineages of textual transmission, and it remains
moreover uncertain when the confusion of names arose. In order
for the argument to be conclusive, proof would need to be given
that this happened before the composition of the Milindapañha (in
theory Vajirå could be the correct identification, and the error
would have happened in the MËlasarvåstivåda tradition at a time
when the relevant part of the Milindapañha was already in
existence; moreover, the Sarvåstivåda and MËlasarvåstivåda
traditions can also show such variations to one another). 11
The Abhidharmakoßopåyikå-†¥kå follows the AbhidharmakoßabhåΣya in explicitly referring to the status of the bhikΣuˆ¥ as an
arhat¥, a fully liberated female monastic – corresponding to dgra
bcom ma in the Abhidharmakoßopåyikå-†¥kå and the Tibetan
translation of the AbhidharmakoßabhåΣya and 阿 羅 漢 in the
Chinese translations of the same work (the latter have no gender
8

Mil 28,5–6: bhåsitam p’ etaµ, mahåråja, vajiråya bhikkhuniyå bhagavato
saµmukhå. This attribution is considered an interpolation by Bingenheimer
2011: 158–159 note 13.
9
A Sarvåstivåda affiliation of the Pali Milindapañha has been proposed on the
basis of doctrinal elements by Horner 1969: xviii and xlii, Norman 1983:
112 and Guang Xing 2008: 238; cf. Conze 1970: 412. On the affiliation of
this work see now the remarks in Anålayo 2020d: 205–206 note 4.
10

T 1670B at T XXXII 706b11–12: 那先言佛經說之如合聚.

11

See for example the name variations between Sarvåstivåda and MËlasarvåstivåda
in discourse titles listed in Anålayo 2011: I 467 note 139.
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specification and so do not represent a feminine arhat¥ but a nonspecific arhat). Even though this epithet is not featured as such
either in the actual discourse quotation in the Abhidharmakoßopåyikå-†¥kå or in its Chinese and Pali parallels, nor elsewhere
in the Bhikkhun¥-saµyutta/BhikΣuˆ¥-saµyuktas discourses, the
Saµyukta-ågama versions contain a final declaration of full
liberation on the part of the nun (with the same pattern recurring
throughout the BhikΣuˆ¥-saµyuktas).
Last, a terminology peculiarity in the Abhidharmakoßopåyikå-†¥kå is the use of ‘mindfulness’ (sm®ti) apparently
intending a function present in every state of mind so as to enable
memory. This development is in line with other traces of doctrinal
development seen in the discourse quotations in the
Abhidharmakoßopåyikå-†¥kå that are possible reflections of or
precursors to notions emerging in Sarvåstivåda Abhidharma.
Translation of Up 901412
[Citation from the AbhidharmakoßabhåΣya:] “The arhat¥ Íailå

12

Identified in HonjØ 1984: 118–119 [no. 14]; cf. also Påsådika 1989: 125 [no.
508], Enomoto 1994: 42 [no. 1202] and Chung 2008: 228. Japanese
translation in HonjØ 2014: II 892–894. The text is found at C, mngon pa,
nyu 84a5–b6; D 4094, mngon pa, nyu 82a1–82b2 (with B 3323, mngon pa,
nyu 9482–9498, apparatus in vol. 162 p. 993); G 3598, mdzod ’grel, thu
154b6–155a4; N, mngon pa, thu 128b5–129b1; P 5595, mngon pa’i bstan
bcos, thu 128a2–128b4 (the references are inclusive of the canonical
quotation from the AbhidharmakoßabhåΣya). A Sanskrit fragment of an
uddåna associated to a Sanskrit saµyukta possibly related to either T 99 or T
100 gives satva, ‘being’, as a keyword representative of this discourse; see
Waldschmidt 1980: 144 and SHT X 1399 v3: satvaß. The uddåna related to
the BhikΣuˆ¥-saµyukta in T 99 is not preserved. The uddåna related to the
BhikΣuˆ¥-saµyukta in T 100 at T II 456b21–23 gives as keywords for the
discourses in this saµyukta the names of the respective nun protagonist of
each discourse; see Waldschmidt 1980: 144–147 and Bingenheimer 2011:
159; cf. also Chung 2008: 228. My translation is based on a collated edition
of Up 9014 that takes into account the readings in the Beijing (B), Cone (C),
Derge (D), Golden (G), Narthang (N) and Peking (P) editions of the Tanjur;
my annotation below covers most variations between the editions but does
not cover differences in the usage of punctuation marks. For other cited
texts, I generally do not give variant readings, e.g., from the Asian editions
of the Pali Saµyutta-nikåya, etc., as particularly the verses have numerous
discrepancies which would make the footnotes become unwieldy.
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addressed Måra beginning with …”13
[Discourse quotation:] The opening is ‘at Íråvast¥’.14
At that time 15 the nun Íailå was staying 16 at Íråvast¥’s 17 Royal
Rains Residence for nuns.18 Then in the morning, having taken robe
13

Up 9014 in D 4094, mngon pa, nyu 82a1 and P 5595, mngon pa’i bstan bcos,
thu 128a2: dgra bcom ma brag gis bdud las brtsams te zhes bya ba la. For
the complete quotation in the AbhidharmakoßabhåΣya IX see Pradhan 1967:
465,22–466,4 and Lee and Ejima 2005: 74, 2–6: ßailayåpy arhantyå måram
årabhyoktam: manyase kiµ nu sattveti måra d®Σ†igataµ (Ejima; Pradhan:
mårad®Σ†igataµ) hi te | ßËnya˙ saµskårapuñjo ’yaµ na hi sattvo ’tra
(Ejima; Pradhan: sattvotra) vidyate || yathaiva hy a∫gasaµbhåråt saµjñå
ratha iti sm®tå | evaµ skandhån upådåya saµv®tyå sattva ucyate || iti;
Tibetan translation in D 4090, mngon pa, khu 86a6–7 and P 5591, mngon pa’i
bstan bcos, ngu 98b3–4: dgra bcom pa drug gis kyang bdud las ba rtsams
nas: sems can zhes bya bdud ci sems || khyod ni lta bar gyur pa yin || ’du
byed phung po ’di stong ste || ’di la sems can yod ma yin || ji ltar yan lag tshogs
rnams la || shing rta’i ming du bshad pa ltar || de bzhin phung po rnams
brten nas || kun rdzob sems can zhes bya’o || zhes bshad do (edited in Lee
and Ejima 2005: 75,1–10); Chinese in T 1559 at T XXIX 306a3–6: 有阿羅漢比
丘尼名世羅 , 對魔王說此偈言: 如從和合分, 於中說車名, 如此依諸陰 , 假
名說眾生 (the first of the two Sanskrit verses is not included in T 1559; cf.
also Ejima in Lee and Ejima 2005: 74 note 237) and T 1558 at T XXIX
154b16–21: 有阿羅漢苾芻尼名世羅, 為魔王說: 汝墮惡見趣, 於空行聚中, 妄
執有有情 , 智者達非有 , 如即攬眾分 , 假想立為車, 世俗立有情, 應知攬諸
蘊 (translated in de la Vallée Poussin 1980 [1925]: V 249 with note 2).
Yaßomitra’s Abhidharmakoßavyåkhyå in Wogihara 1971 [1932–1936]: 704,
commenting on the relevant AbhidharmakoßabhåΣya discussion, does not
quote the canonical discourse. On a series of refrains in the
Saddharmasm®tyupasthåna-sËtra (§4.2.27.4) echoing these verses see Stuart
2015: I 144 and II 93 and 191.

14

The opening corresponds with the Buddha’s location in SÓ 1202 at T II 327a19,
SÓ2 218 at T 454c14–15 and SN 5.10 at SN I 296,3–4 where it is given in full.

15
16

Adopting the reading de’i tshe in BCDGP; N reads: tsho for tshe.
Adopting the reading bzhugs in N (and in line with subsequent occurrences in
all editions); BCDGP read: zhugs.

17

Adopting the reading mnyan yod kyi in BCD; GNP read: mnyan yod du kyi.

18

The Tibetan reads: rgyal po’i dge slong ma’i dbyar khang, pointing, literally,
to *råjå-bhikΣuˆ¥-varΣaka, that is, the Råjakåråma, which according to Jå II
15,1–2 was commissioned by King Pasenadi to be built in the proximity of
Jeta’s Grove. The same setting is found in SÓ 1202 at T II 327a 20–21, whereas
neither SÓ2 218 at T 454c15 nor SN 5.10 at SN I 296,4 specify the nun’s
place of residence. The Råjakåråma is the nuns’ monastic residence in all
discourses in the BhikΣuˆ¥-saµyukta of T 99 (SÓ 1198 to SÓ 1207). Their
counterparts in T 100 explicitly indicate the nuns’ whereabouts in the case
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and bowl, the nun Íailå went into Íråvast¥ for alms.19
Having completed the alms round, 20 she partook of her
meal. After eating,21 she washed her bowl.22 Having put her robe
and bowl to one side and taking a sitting mat, 23 she went to the
vicinity of the Blind Men’s Grove.24 Having reached it, she entered
the Blind Men’s Grove. She sat at the foot of a tree in order [to
spend] the day’s abiding25 based there.26

of SÓ2 219 at T II 455a9–10, SÓ2 220 at T II 455b3+b6–7, SÓ2 222 at T II
455c24+28 and SÓ2 223 at T 456a23, which refer to the Råjakåråma as 王園精
舍 . The Råjakåråma also features as a nuns’ residence in the *[BhikΣuˆ¥]Dharmadinnå-sËtra quotation in Up 1005, parallel to MÓ 210 and MN 44
(translated in Anålayo 2012 [2011]: 40). On this setting as a venue for
teachings given to the nuns by the Buddha or monks see Deeg 2005: 293–
294 and Anålayo 2015 [2014]: 205 note 13. These occurrences counter the
remarks by von Hinüber 2019: 91, who seems to consider it doubtful that
the Råjakåråma was a nunnery, reasoning that it could have been “a
monastery or simply a park, where ascetics including Buddhists used to stay
and where there was a monastery.”
19
20

Adopting the reading bzhugs in N; BCDGP read: zhugs.
For bsod snyoms (sbyad pa) as a rendering of piˆ∂apata(-cårika) or
piˆ∂apåtika see Harrison 1990: 324, s.v.

21

Here and in the repetition of the same passage below (part of Måra’s
rumination), SÓ 1202 at T II 327a22+27 explicitly notes that she returned to
the monastery, a detail that, even though not mentioned, is implicit in both
Up 9014 and SÓ2 218. The corresponding module in SN 5.10 is shorter and
simply says that the nun (here Vajirå) wandered for alms in Såvatth¥ and,
after her return from the alms round and having partaken of the meal, went
to the Blind Men’s Grove. SN 5.10 does not repeat this passage on her
wandering for alms etc. as part of Måra’s rumination below; see note 30.
22
The Tibetan reads: lhung bzed phyogs gcig tu bzhag; for a different verbal form in
this module elsewhere in the Abhidharmakoßopåyikå-†¥kå see Dhammadinnå
2014: 104–105 note 81.
23

Here and in the below repetition of the same passage (part of Måra’s
rumination), SÓ 1202 at T II 327a22–23 mentions that she had placed the
sitting mat over her shoulder, a detail that is not noted explicitly in Up 9014
and SÓ2 218 (nor in SN 5.10).

24

Adopting the reading nags tshal in BCDNP; G reads: nag for nags.

25

Adopting the reading nyin in GNP; BCD read: nyan.

26

Adopting the reading rten in GNP; BCD read: brten. For an example of this
narrative module in a MËlasarvåstivåda text in Sanskrit see, e.g., the
MËlasarvåstivåda Vinaya in Gnoli 1977: I 149,21–22: anyatarad v®kΣamËlaµ
nißritya niΣaˆˆo divåvihåråya.
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Then Måra, the Evil One thought thus: “That recluse
Gautama is now residing at Íråvast¥’s Jeta’s Grove,
Anåthapiˆ∂ada’s Park. A disciple of his, the nun Íailå, is staying at
Íråvast¥’s Royal Rains Residence for nuns. [To be recited] exactly
as earlier from … ‘in the morning, having taken robe27 and bowl’
… up to … ‘she sat at the foot of a tree in order [to spend] the day’s
abiding based there.’28 I must go [to where she is] with the purpose
to distract her.”29
He manifested himself in the form of a vigorous youth and
went to the place where the nun Íailå [was abiding]. Having
reached it, he placed himself before the nun Íailå and spoke to her
in verse:30
“Who has created such beings?31
Who is the maker of beings?
Where does a being come from? 32
Where does it go?”33
27

Adopting the reading chos gos in BCGNP; D wrongly reads: tshas gos.

28

The corresponding passages in SÓ 1202 and SÓ 2 218 do not abbreviate at this
juncture.

29

Adopting the reading rnam par g.yeng ba’i las kyi phyir in BCGNP; D
wrongly reads: g.yang ba for g.yeng ba. SÓ 1202 at T II 327b23–27 and SÓ2
218 at T II 455b5–9 do not abbreviate the report of Måra’s thoughts. On the
employment of textual abbreviation in the Saµyukta-ågama and the
Madhyama-ågama see Anålayo 2020a and 2021b, and in the Saµyuktaågama quotations in the Abhidharmakoßopåyikå-†¥kå Dhammadinnå 2020:
568–571.

30

In SÓ 1202 at T II 327b4–6 Íailå wonders about the identity of the person
before her and then realises that this is Måra, wishing to confound her. SN
5.10 at SN I 296,11–14 does not repeat the passage with the nun wandering for
alms etc. as part of Måra’s rumination, only saying that he desired to arouse
fear in her and make her fall away from her meditative concentration.

31

The word sems can, ‘being’, ‘sentient being’, is followed by pluralisers in the
first and second padas of Måra’s verse (sems can ’di dag and sems can
rnams respectively), but not in the remaining padas nor elsewhere in the
verses spoken by Íailå. The plural here is most likely due to metrical
requirements (seven-syllable padas) and does not seem to have any special
significance.

32

Adopting the reading rab tu skyes in BCD (cf. SÓ 1202 at T II 327b3: 起; SÓ2

218 at T II 454c23: 生; SN 5.10 at SN I 297,17: samuppanno); GNP read: rab
tu byed.
33
This verse matches the corresponding verses in SÓ 1202 at T II 327b2–3, SÓ2
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[She replied]:34
“Måra,35 do you conceive of a ‘being’?
This is bound up with [false] view [on your part].
This heap of fabrications is empty:
Within it, no ‘being’ is to be found.36
For when its parts are assembled together,
Mindfulness of the notion of a ‘chariot’ arises,
So, taking up37 the aggregates,
218 at T II 454c22–23 and SN 5.10 at SN I 296,21–24 except that pada d of Up
9014 in D 4094, mngon pa, nyu 82a6–7 and P 5595, mngon pa’i bstan bcos,
thu 128b1 and SÓ 1202 at T II 327c2 speak of where a being will go, sems
can gang du ’gro bar ’gyur and 形去至何所; in the corresponding pada c in
SÓ2 218 at T II 454c23 Måra asks why a ‘being’ is thus called, 云何名眾生;
and in the related pada d of SN 5.10 at SN I 296,18 the question is where
does such a being cease, kuvaµ satto nirujjhat¥ ti.
34

After the first verse spoken by Måra, SÓ 1202 at T II 327b4–6, SÓ2 218 at T II
454c24–26 and SN 5.10 at SN I 296,19–23 have a narrative interlude with Íailå
pondering who is the person who has spoken, wanting to frighten her, and
realising that it is Måra. The absence of this interlude in Up 9014 could be
due to abbreviation either in the original discourse accessed by
Íamathadeva or, more likely, in the Abhidharmakoßopåyikå-†¥kå’s quotation
format.

35

Adopting the reading bdud kyi in CDP; GN wrongly read: bdud rtsi and bdud
ci respectively.

36

For the quotation of this verse in the AbhidharmakoßabhåΣya see note 13. The
corresponding verse in SÓ 1202 at T II 327b7–8 is: 汝謂有眾生, 此則惡魔見,
唯有空陰聚, 無是眾生者. The counterpart in SÓ2 218 at T II 454c27–28 reads:
眾魔生邪見, 謂有眾生想, 假空以聚會, 都無有眾生; SN 5.10 at SN I 296,26–
297,2 has: kiµ nu satto ti paccesi, måra di††higataµ nu te;
suddhasa∫khårapuñjo ’yaµ, na yidha sattupalabbhati. Thus a minor
variation is that whereas Up 9014 speaks of an empty heap of fabrications
(’du byed phung po ’di stong), in agreement with the citation in the
AbhidharmakoßabhåΣya (ßËnya˙ saµskårapuñjo ’yaµ), SÓ 1202 at T II
327b8 speaks of an assemblage of empty aggregates (空陰聚), SÓ2 218 at T
II 454c28 of an empty assemblage (空以聚會), and SN 5.10 at SN I 297,1 has
a heap of mere or sheer fabrications (suddhasa∫khårapuñjoyaµ); cf. also
Anålayo 2015 [2014]: 215 with note 30. A citation of padas c and d of this
verse from an unnamed discourse appears in the Udånavarga-vivaraˆa on
Udånavarga XII.7 [254], Balk 1984: I 437,15–16: ’dus byas kyi tshogs ’di dag
ni stong pa ste. ’di la sems can med do zhes bya ba mdo las gsungs so.
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One speaks conventionally of a ‘being’.” 38
Their arising is [just] du˙kha,39
[Their] persistence is [just] du˙kha.40
It is just du˙kha which ceases to exist,
They are none other than a mass of du˙kha.”41
37

Adopting the reading nyer len las in BCD; GNP read: nye len las.

38

For the quotation of this verse in the AbhidharmakoßabhåΣya see note 13. The
corresponding verse in SÓ 1202 at T II 327b9–11 reads: 如和合眾材, 世名之為
車, 諸陰因緣合, 假名為眾生; the counterpart in SÓ2 218 at T II 454c29–455a1
is: 譬如因眾緣 , 和合有車用, 陰界入亦爾, 因緣和合有 ; SN 5.10 at SN I
296,3–6 reads: yathå hi a∫gasambhårå, hoti saddo ratho iti; evaµ khandhesu
santesu, hoti satto ti sammuti. Thus SÓ2 218 departs from the other versions
in including the elements and sense bases besides the aggregates. This verse is
also quoted in Sa∫ghabhadra’s *Nyåyånusåra, T 1562 at T XXVI 483b13–14:
如即攬眾分 , 假相說為車 , 世俗說有情 , 應知攬諸蘊 . Up 9014 at D 4094,
mngon pa, nyu 82a7 and P 5595, mngon pa’i bstan bcos, thu 128b2 (shing
rta’i ’du shes dran pa ’byung) and the canonical citation in the
AbhidharmakoßabhåΣya differ from the other discourse versions by explicitly
introducing the notion of a perception (saµjñå) and relating it to mindfulness
(sm®ti) at this juncture; see AbhidharmakoßabhåΣya IX in Pradhan 1967: 466,3:
yathaiva hy a∫gasaµbhåråt saµjñå ratha iti sm®tå, “For just like from an
assemblage of parts there is mindfulness of the perception ‘chariot’; D 4090,
mngon pa, khu 86a8 and P 5591, mngon pa’i bstan bcos, ngu 98b4: ji ltar
yan lag tshogs rnams la | shing rta’i ming du bshad pa ltar, “Just as one
articulates the name of a ‘chariot” on account of its parts.” This appears to
reflect a Sarvåstivåda doctrinal position that involves a shift in the
understanding of sm®ti to become a function present in every state of mind
so as to enable memory; cf. Cox 1992: 83 and, on other traces of textual
development in terminology in the discourses in the Abhidharmakoßopåyikå-†¥kå as possible reflections of or precursors to specific doctrinal
developments in Sarvåstivåda Abhidharma, see Dhammadinnå 2019 On the
relationship between mindfulness and memory in the early Buddhist
discourses see Anålayo 2016: 1273–1275, 2017: 26–34 and 2018.

39

Adopting the reading sdug bsngal te in BCDNP; G reads: ste for te.

40

Adopting the reading sdug bsngal te in BCDNP; G reads: ste for te.

41

For the quotation of this verse in the AbhidharmakoßabhåΣya see note 13. The
corresponding verse in SÓ 1202 at T II 327b11–13 reads very closely to Up
9014: 其生則苦生 , 住亦即苦住, 無餘法生苦, 苦生苦自滅. The half-verse
counterpart in SÓ2 218 at T II 455a2, 業緣故聚會, 業緣故散滅, speaks of
coming together and ceasing because of karmic conditions. SN 5.10 at SN I
297,7–10 is in line with Up 9014 and SÓ 1202: dukkham eva hi sambhoti,
dukkhaµ ti††hati veti ca; nåññatra dukkhå sambhoti, nåññaµ dukkhå
nirujjhat¥ ti. Thus here SÓ2 218 diverges from all other versions. After the
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Then Måra, the Evil One, thinking “the nun Íailå 42 read my
mind with her mind”, was troubled and dejected. Disappointed, he
vanished right then and there.
The Chariot Simile in the Early Indian Ideological Context
The gist of the teaching delivered by the fully awakened
bhikΣuˆ¥ Íailå is that different parts are functionally assembled to
make up a chariot rather than there being a permanent essence or
substance. Similarly, the different components constituted by the
five aggregates come together to form subjective experience. Once
the parts are taken apart, no chariot entity as such can be found
besides those. Likewise, it is baseless to endow with ontological
gravitas a sentient being simply constituted by a changing and
dependently arisen assemblage of also changing and dependently
arisen processes. Here the scheme of the five aggregates serves the
purpose of analysing the construction of identity, subject to
appropriation and thus pinpointing the scope or domain of
identification in terms of compact selfhood. This assemblage of
aggregates, this ‘being’, is nothing but unsatisfactory (du˙kha), in
the sense of being unable to offer lasting comfort or satisfaction.
All versions of the illustration – in the Abhidharmakoßopåyikå-†¥kå discourse quotation and its parallels – convey the basic
idea that a ‘chariot’ is just a conceptual category, but they use
slightly different terms to make this point. The arising of the notion
of ‘chariot’ can be related to the functions of saµjñå (Pali sañña),
perception or conceptual identification. Saµjñå allows for (shared)
recognition and identification in terms of both cognising and
nun’s verses, SÓ 1202 at T II 327b13–15 and SÓ2 218 at T II 455a3–5 end with
their respective versions of the standard declaration made by the nuns in the
Chinese BhikΣuˆ¥-saµyuktas that they have known or defeated Måra and are
fully liberated (which have some discrepancies in wording); this declaration
does not appear in SN 5.10 nor in the other discourses of the Pali Bhikkhun¥saµyutta. This is followed in all versions by the narrative conclusion
reporting Måra’s defeat (again with some discrepancies in wording). Up
9014 does not include the nun’s standard declaration and moves on directly
to the narrative conclusion reporting Måra’s defeat. Again, this is most
likely a case of abbreviation in the citation format, with no necessary
significance concerning the recension of the discourse underlying the
citation in the Abhidharmakoßopåyikå-†¥kå.
42

Adopting the reading brag gis in N; BCDGP read: brag gi for brag gis.
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naming or identifying the information provided by the various
senses, resulting from contact with the composite external object
that one normally calls ‘chariot’. This happens through an
associative and comparative operation that involves an act of
becoming aware as a dimension of mindfulness (sm®ti) – as
clarified in verse by bhikΣuˆ¥ Íailå in the Abhidharmakoßopåyikå†¥kå discourse quotation – which allows for organising the
information processed in this way for delivery to consciousness.43
Through this dynamic, the ‘what’ or content is seized by the ‘who’
or identity dimension of subjective experience.
The recognition performed by saµjñå also leads to the
emergence of fully formed concepts. Saµjñå usually results in a
‘concept’ and in a certain shared cognitive baseline that is reflected
in common parlance.44 Whatever is verbally expressed in this way,
has previously been subject to the activity of recognition, of which
it is the outcome. 45 This relates to the fact that within the early
43

44

45

The AbhidharmakoßabhåΣya and Abhidharmakoßopåyikå-†¥kå specifically
bring in the terminology sm®ti and sm®tå in relation to saµjñå; see note 38.
Note that saµjñå may not invariably imply conceptualisation, as several
discourses employ this term in relation to the fourth immaterial sphere of
neither-perception-nor-non-perception, e.g., nevasaññanasaññayatanasaññå
used in AN 11.10 at AN V 326,2–3 and 非想非非想入處想 in its parallel SÓ
926 at T II 236a29). Anålayo 2012 [2012]: 335–336 explains that “this might
be just a manner of speaking, since the actual experience of neitherperception-nor-non- perception, as its name indicates, is a type of
experience outside the range of what can still be properly considered a
‘perception’. This becomes evident from a number of discourses which, in
order to describe the whole range of possible experiences, distinguish between
beings with perceptual experiences, those that do not have perceptual
experiences (i.e., which are unconscious), and beings with the experience of
neither-perception-nor-non-perception. By employing a separate category
for neither-perception-nor-non-perception, these discourses indicate that this
type of experience is neither a perceptual experience, nor a form of
unconsciousness. That the fourth immaterial attainment does not fully
qualify as a type of perception also becomes evident from other passages,
according to which the third immaterial attainment already constitutes the
pinnacle of perception.”
MÓ 111 at T I 599c29–600a1: 云何知想有報? 謂說也. 隨其想便說, 是謂知想
有報 (translated in Anålayo and Bucknell 2020: II 309) and AN 6.63 at AN III
413,20–22: katamo ca, bhikkhave, saññånaµ vipåko? vohåravepakkhåhaµ,
bhikkhave, saññaµ vadåmi; yathå yathå naµ sañjanati, tathå tathå
voharati, evaµ saññ¥ ahosin ti (translated in Bodhi 2012: 962); on this
passage cf. also Boisvert 1995: 78. On various English renditions of
saµjñå/sañña see Del Toso 2015.
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Buddhist analysis of experience, saµjñå features both as an
aggregate and, in the context of the cognitive model that explains
mutual conditioning between name-and-form and consciousness,
as one of the five components of ‘name’ (nåman), which represents
the conceptual element of experience. Saµjñå requires the
activation of the linguistic function, but may even precede the
articulation of language as such. 46 In short, it “represents the
matching of experience with concepts and thereby stands for
cognition and recognition” (Anålayo 2019b: 181).47
On this basis, the point of bhikΣuˆ¥ Íailå’s illustration is not
a denial of the conditioned existence of a chariot or a self, but a
calling into question the shift from concept to ontology evident in
Måra’s pressing her on the characteristics of a ‘being’. Måra
ignores, or possibly denies, the dependently arisen nature of the
very construction of experience. The position Íailå takes does not
entail a proposal of nominalism (be it in the form of a rejection of
abstract objects or in the form of a rejection of universals). The use
of the notions or terms ‘chariot’ and ‘being’ are not problematized
as such. Nor does Íailå make a metaphysical affirmation of their
conventional existence but ultimate or absolute non-existence,
unlike the type of arguments that developed in later Buddhist
tradition. Moreover, while the teaching of no self “clearly opposes
the notion that an eternal core can be found behind the changing
processes of the five aggregates that make up an individual, it does
not deny the existence of this changing process as such nor the
empirically verifiable fact of personal continuity.” Thus “the denial
of the existence of an eternal chariot independent of its parts does
not mean that it is impossible to drive with the impermanent and
conditioned assemblage of parts to which the term chariot refers”
46

Ñåˆananda 2015 [2003–2012]: 5 gives the example of a toddler who is still
unable to speak or understand language. Someone gives him a rubber ball,
which the child has seen for the first time. He gets to know that object by
smelling it, feeling it, perhaps trying to eat it, and finally rolling it on the
floor and reckons it as something to play with. The toddler has recognised
the rubber ball not by the name that the world has given it, but by those
factors included under ‘name’ in nåma-rËpa, i.e., feeling tones, perception,
intention, contact and attention, which constitute a sort of ‘prototype’ of
‘name’.

47

On concept in the context of name, name-and-form and consciousness in
relation to the fabric of conceptuality see in more detail Ñåˆananda 2012
[1971]; Dhammadinnå 2017 and 2021; Anålayo 2019b, 2020e, 2020f and
2020g.
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(Anålayo 2013a: 96–97).
In fact overcoming the polarisation between notions of
existence and non-existence in regard to the world of experience
and the dependency upon them, without engaging and clinging
through taking a stance ‘this is my self’, amounts to acquiring the
certainty that “what arises is only du˙kha arising, what ceases is
only du˙kha ceasing.”48 Along similar lines, Íailå’s last verse in
the Abhidharmakoßopåyikå-†¥kå, the complete Saµyukta-ågama
and the Saµyutta-nikåya (with a different formulation in the
shorter Saµyukta-ågama) points out that the very arising and
persistence (while changing) of the aggregates is just du˙kha, as it
is just du˙kha which ceases to exist, the aggregates being none
other than a mass of du˙kha.
Íailå’s concern is therefore with the fundamental error
underlying Måra’s provocation that invests this unsatisfactory
process with ontological relevance. Such an error could be
envisaged to result in an ongoing maintenance of subjective
experience as a chariot that continues to ride on in saµsåric
existence. The illustration of the chariot conveys that neither the
designation nor the concept of a ‘being’ need to rely on or imply
the ontologically founded existence of a ‘being’ as a substantial
entity. The point at stake is not nomenclature, whether one may or
may not legitimately call a chariot ‘chariot’ and a (sentient) being
‘(sentient) being,’ just because on closer inspection they turn out to
be compounded and not homogenous or unitary, essential entities.
More simply, Íailå has fully penetrated the mechanisms of the
construction of subjective experience that make it liable to selfreferentiality, and exposed Måra’s unwarranted metaphysical shift.
In the early discourses Måra impersonates antagonistic
challenges to the Buddha’s teachings and their practice, thus it is
no surprise to hear him give voice to a view opposite to the
Buddhist worldview, in this case a key presupposition held in the
early Indian philosophical landscape. The Buddha had reversed this
48

Nidåna-saµyukta 19 in Chung and Fukita 2020: 168,2–3 (Tripå†h¥ 1962: 170,2–5):
du˙kha idam utpadyamånam utpadyate, du˙khaµ nirudhyamånaµ
nirudhyate; SÓ 301 at T II 85c24: 苦生而生, 苦滅而滅; SN 12.15 at SN II
17,30: dukkham eva uppajjamånaµ uppajjati, dukkhaµ nirujjhamånaµ
nirujjhati (Chung and Fukita 2020: 160 give SN 22.90 at SN III 132–135 as
the Pali parallel to the Sanskrit discourse Nidåna-saµyukta 19 and SÓ 301,
without giving reference to SN 12.15, which seems an error to me).
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presupposition through his teachings on no self, conditionality and
emptiness, clarifying that a permanent essence or self cannot be
found anywhere at all. 49 Måra’s assumption of a substantialist
notion of a ‘being’ and the early Buddhist use of the chariot
imagery articulated in Íailå’s response can be read in light of early
Indian culture and of the Brahmanical metaphysical view.
Throughout Vedic times, the “chariot was not merely a practical
instrument for conveying persons, but an object vested with
religious significance and symbolic values” (Sparreboom 1985: 1).
More precisely, this vehicle “functioned as a sacred space ‘in
motion’” (Mucciarelli 2017: 169). 50 The emergence and diffusion of
the complex mobile technology of the chariot in early Indian
culture forms the backdrop to a range of metaphorical or symbolic
uses of the chariot imagery in ancient Indian texts: “steering fast
chariots was a demanding and fascinating task: an intensive
experience of speed and mid-distance travel, but also a dangerous
device”, thus, it is not surprising that “chariots (and chariot rides)
were taken as a source domain, forming a dynamic ‘anthropotherio-technological metaphor’ for the interpretation of abstract
target domains such as body, soul and liberation. … chariots were
depicted as vehicles of gods such as the sun, i.e. as a symbol of
cosmic stability; they were, moreover, used as symbols of royal
power and social prestige, e.g. of kings and warriors … and,
finally, chariots served as metaphors for the ‘person’, the ‘mind’
and the ‘way to liberation’” (Schlieter 2016: 168).
In the abstract cognitive domain represented by the
relationship between a ‘steering mind’ and the ‘self’ (or, rather, the
‘Self’), the Ka†ha (or Kå†haka) UpaniΣad uses the chariot as a
simile to explain the soul’s journey to final emancipation (a goal
that is conceived of as immortality by way of an ontological
merger with the absolute). Here the self (åtman) is the driver, the
49

This goes to show that the various episodes involving Måra reported in the
early Buddhist discourses are not invariably a representation of inner
uncertainties or defilements of the person he approaches, contrary to the
trend in Buddhist modernism to see his role confined to embodying facets of
the inner experience of a Buddhist practitioner; see Anålayo 2015 [2014]:
201–205 and Anålayo 2021a: 92–93 and 119.

50

On chariots and chariotry in Indo-European, Indo-Aryan, Early Greek and
Early Indian culture and religion see among others the studies by
Sperreboom 1985, Raulwing 2000, Parpola 2004–2005, Schlieter 2016 and
Mucciarelli 2017.
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chariot is the human body, and the intellect (buddhi), by means of
the reins represented by the mind (manas), steers the chariot
guiding the horses.51
The KauΣ¥taki UpaniΣad employs the chariot imagery in the
service of a unitary notion of, and perpetual correspondence
between, the different particles of being that make up the different
dimensions of a person. The particles of intelligence (prajñå) and
the breath are all fastened together just as in a chariot the rim is
fastened to the spokes and the spokes to the hub. This very breath is
held to be the self, bliss, unageing, immortal, not subject to
becoming more or becoming less on account of good or bad
actions. It is the ruler, sovereign and lord of the world of which one
should realize that ‘He is my self (åtman).’52
The Maitr¥ (or Maitråyaˆa, etc.) UpaniΣad considers the
body without intelligence (prajñå) to be like a chariot. This chariot
is in need of a being, imperceptible to the senses, who has the
power to make it appear intelligent and who is its mover. Such a
being is stainless, eternal, indestructible, unchangeable, etc. This is
none other than the god Prajåpati (here generated at the beginning
of creation from the supreme being consisting of sac-cid-ånanda,
existence/truth, consciousness and bliss), who animated inanimate
objects on entering them by way of five winds. Wishing to enjoy
himself, he burst openings in them to create the eyes and other
sense doors. He enjoys objects by means of its five reins
constituted by the five sense organs, with the body being the
chariot, the intellect the charioteer, and character the whip. These
make the body go round and round as a wheel whirled by a potter.
In this way the body chariot is animated by its creator and mover.53
51

Ka†ha UpaniΣad III.3–12, text and translation in Olivelle 1998: 388–391.

52

KauΣ¥taki UpaniΣad III.8, text and translation in Olivelle 1998: 354–355.

53

Maitr¥ UpaniΣad II.3.3–6, text and translation in Cowell 1870: 19–36 and 244–
248. For a detailed analysis of explicit doctrinal parallels in the use of the
chariot symbolism for the mind in the UpaniΣads and the Bhagavadg¥tå see
Ježić 2009. In passing, one of the standard epithets of the Buddha featured
in the early discourses is that of a ‘charioteer of men to be tamed’,
puruΣadamyasårathi in Sanskrit or purisadhammasårathi in Pali, preceded
by the qualification ‘unexcelled’ or ‘unsurpassed’ anuttara-, either taken as
part of the compound (as is generally the case in the Pali tradition) or as a
separate quality (as is generally the case in the Sanskrit traditions); see Endo
2002 [1997]: 180–182 and, on the Chinese renditions of this epithet, Nattier
2003: 227–230 and Anålayo 2011: I 53–54 note 134. A metaphor involving
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Måra’s proposition could well be meant to echo such
metaphysical ideologies. Prior to the emergence of the UpaniΣads,
the sacral value of the chariot is already attested since the Vedic
period. Of the three UpaniΣads I mentioned above, the KauΣ¥taki is
probably pre-Buddhist and can be assigned to the sixth to fifth
centuries BC; the Ka†ha, exhibiting strong theistic tendencies, is
among the earliest literary products of the theistic tradition and was
composed probably in the last few centuries BC (Olivelle 1998: 12–
13); and the age and homogeneity of the Maitr¥ UpaniΣad has been
the subject of an array of divergent theories, ranging from
exceptional antiquity to significant lateness, due to the heterogenous
and composite character of the received text (Cohen 2008: 253–265).
However, as Patrick Olivelle (1998: 12) remarks, “any dating of
these documents that attempts a precision closer than a few
centuries is as stable as a house of cards”. Thus the passages I
referenced are not meant to pinpoint a direct precedent to which the
early Buddhist use of the chariot simile would have responded.
They rather provide windows onto themes and motifs that were
being formulated prior to the Buddha’s time or during his lifetime,
and that circulated in ancient India during the period of early
Buddhism – Early Buddhism is intended here as a textual, doctrinal
and historical periodisation that covers the development of thought
and practices during roughly the first two centuries in the history of
Buddhism, up to about the third century BC (Anålayo 2012a).
Evidently Íailå’s verses undermine the crucial link between
a charioteer is also used in MÓ 193 at T I 744b10–20 and its parallel MN 21 at
MN I 124,7–25 (translated in Bodhi and Ñåˆamoli 1995: 218–219), where the
Buddha is on record for being pleased with the practice of the first
generation of his monastics, no longer needing to instruct them but only to
arouse mindfulness in them. This is similar to a skilled trainer, a charioteer
of horses to be tamed, who might mount a chariot on even ground at the
crossroads, harnessed to thoroughbreds, and drive at will by any road
whenever he likes (on later developments concerning the notion of the
Buddha as a master of training see Stuart 2015: I 228–233). The same
illustration is used in a simile in MN 119 at MN III 96, 2–14 (translated in
Bodhi and Ñåˆamoli 1995: 956; not found in the parallel MÓ 81) describing
how one who is established in mindfulness of the body is able to reach any
desired attainment just like driving a chariot as wished; other occurrences of
this description are noted in Anålayo 2011: II 677 note 168 (on aspects of
mindfulness related to the imagery of a chariot or a charioteer in several
similes in the early discourses see Anålayo 2020h: 65–66, 167–168 and
239).
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the parts of subjective experience that constitute a living being and
their pointing to something beyond themselves. Íailå puts all of
this down to none other than a mass of du˙kha. Her verses
translated above from the Tibetan version conclude with a personal
declaration of full awakening. In the fairly similar formulations of
this standard declaration in the two Chinese Saµyukta-ågama
versions, she spells out the import of her final knowledge by
stating in the first person that she has relinquished all craving and
du˙kha and is completely apart from the darkness of ignorance,
having realized the peace of extinction. 54 This formulaic closure
becomes particularly poignant in one of the two Chinese versions
(SÓ 1202), as it comes right after she has stated that the arising of
that (misconceived) ‘being’ is just the arising of du˙kha, its
persistence also just the persistence of du˙kha, etc. In what
according to tradition was the first sermon given by the Buddha
after his awakening, the five aggregates are used to state in brief
the scope of du˙kha. 55 Even more succinctly, in another related
discourse the five aggregates of clinging correspond to the first
noble truth itself.56
In a common scheme of guided contemplation, the Buddha
54

SÓ 1202 at T II 327b13–15 and SÓ2 218 at T II 455a3–5.

55

Among them are, for instance, EÓ 24.5 at T II 619a 10–13: 彼云何名為苦諦? …
取要言之, 五盛陰苦; SN 56.11 at SN V 421,19–24 (= Vin I 10,26–30): idaµ kho
pana, bhikkhave, dukkhaµ ariyasaccaµ … saµkhittena pañcupådånakkhandha
dukkhå; Dharmaguptaka Vinaya in T 1428 at T XXII 788a17–18: 取要言之五盛
陰苦; the Mahåvastu of the Mahåså∫ghika-Lokottaravåda Vinaya in Marciniak
2019: III 432,9–13 (Senart 1897: III 332,1–4): tatra bhikΣava˙ katamaµ
du˙khaµ åryasatyaµ? … rËpaµ du˙khaµ vedanå du˙khå saµjñå du˙khå
saµskårå du˙khå vijñåna du˙kha, saµkΣiptena paµcopådånaskandhå
du˙khå; the second of the two versions of this sermon included in the
Sa∫ghabhedavastu of the MËlasarvåstivåda Vinaya, Gnoli 1977: I 137, 22–26:
du˙kham åryasatyaµ katamat? … sa∫kΣepata˙ pañca ime upådånaskandhå
du˙kham (the corresponding passage in T 1450 at T XXIV 128b5 is
abbreviated); the KΣudrakavastu of the MËlasarvåstivåda Vinaya in T 1451
at T XXIV 407a7–9: 云何苦聖諦? … 若略說者, 謂五趣蘊苦; the Mah¥ßåsaka
Vinaya in T 1421 at T XXII 104b29–c3: 何謂苦聖諦? … 以要言之, 五盛陰
苦 . On the five aggregates of clinging as a summary of the preceding
instances of du˙kha spelled out in the statement of the first noble truth see
Anålayo 2013c: 29 note 56.
56
SN 56.13 at SN V 425, 18–20: katamañ ca, bhikkhave, dukkhaµ ariyasaccaµ?
pañcupådånakkhandhå tissa vacan¥yaµ, seyyathidaµ rËpupådånakkhandho
… viññåˆupådånakkhandho (this discourse has no known parallels).
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or one of his disciples begin by questioning the interlocutor on
whether a certain experiential phenomenon – such as bodily form
(rËpa) and each of the other aggregates – is permanent or
impermanent. The interlocutor grants that it is impermanent. The
next query is whether what is impermanent is du˙kha or happiness,
to which the interlocutor replies that it is du˙kha. The ensuing
question is whether what is impermanent and du˙kha is fit to be
regarded as the self. The interlocutor acknowledges that it cannot
be regarded in this way. 57 This response to the Buddha’s final
question “can only be given by those who know, in advance, that
the term attå is by definition nicca [permanent] and sukha [blissful,
satisfactory], and therefore anything which is anicca and dukkha
cannot be attå. This gives us a clear indication of the type of attå
which is being discussed. It is the UpaniΣadic idea of an åtman
which is nitya and sukha … It seems undeniable that the Buddha’s
audience were aware of the UpaniΣad view” (Norman 1981: 22).
Another presentation demonstrates that an unchanging self
cannot be found in any way in relation to the five aggregates: not
by way of identifying any of the five aggregates as a self; not by
postulating a self as the owner or custodian of an aggregate; not by
assuming that aggregates exist in some way within a self; not by
locating a self within an aggregate.58
In yet another discourse, which contains a deliberate
refutation of Yåjñavalkya’s doctrine recorded in the
B®hadåraˆyaka UpaniΣad, 59 the Buddha somewhat humorously
invites the monks to grasp or rely on what is not impermanent and
will not lead to sorrow, with the Pali version explicitly singling out
grasping a doctrine of a self that (supposedly) does not lead to
57

E.g., SÓ 30 at T II 6b11–c3 (translated in Anålayo 2012b: 49–51) with its
parallels SN 22.49 at SN III 48, 5–50,10 (translated in Bodhi 2000: 888) and
in a Sanskrit fragmentary version in the Manuscript Bendall, de La Vallée
Poussin 1907: 375–378.
58
Up 1005 at D 4094, mngon pa, ju 6b7–7a3 and P 5595, mngon pa’i bstan bcos,
tu 7b7–8a2 with its parallels MÓ 210 at T I 788b4–10 (both translated in
Anålayo 2019a: 6) and MN 44 at MN I 300,4–17 (translated in Ñåˆamoli and
Bodhi 2009 [1995]: 397).
59
The implications of the relationship between this discourse (titled
AlagaddËpama-sutta in the Pali version, MN 22) and UpaniΣadic doctrine of
self have been a matter of debate; see, e.g., Jayatilleke 1963: 60–61,
Norman 1981, Gombrich 1990: 14–21, Bhattacharya 1980, 1973 and 1997,
Wynne 2010 and 2010/2011.
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sorrow as one of the cases in which such grasping will inescapably
lead to disappointment. In the same version, the Buddha is on
record for going so far as qualifying the view that affirms a
permanent self as a completely and utterly foolish teaching, a
remark that is however absent from the Chinese parallel.60In this
way, these analyses convey, from different angles, that the
aggregates cannot possibly fulfil the promise of satisfaction and
bliss of the UpaniΣadic Being/being. The current underlying these
presentations echoes another case of an early Buddhist critical
reinterpretation of a Vedic theme. This is the standard formulation
of the dependent arising of du˙kha – which stands at the core of the
early Buddhist teachings – by way of a twelvefold sequence of
dependently arisen phenomena (ignorance, volitional constructions,
consciousness, name-and-form, etc.), that appears to respond to a
Vedic creation myth (Jurewicz 2000). Not only does the Buddhist
series culminate in du˙kha rather than in a blissful celebration of
creation, it takes things further by proceeding to the cessation
mode. This effectively shows how the entire creation of du˙kha
and existence can be undone through the appropriate removal of
the conditions leading to du˙kha (Anålayo 2020c).
The assonances evoked by the reinterpretation of these
Vedic and UpaniΣadic themes would have had a powerful effect in
the ancient Indian oral culture, where the impact of a visual image
invested with sacred meanings such as the chariot imagery would
have had a deep resonance for the audience. This background puts
into its broader ideological perspective the significance of the early
Buddhist use of the chariot simile to illustrate the characteristic of
absence of an unchanging and essentialised self (anåtman) in
subjective experience, based on the analysis by way of the fiveaggregates (skandha) model. The idea of skandha as ‘group’,
60

MN 22 at MN I 137,17–138,10 (translated in Ñåˆamoli and Bodhi 2009 [1995]:
231–232) and MÓ 200 at T I 765b13–27; see the comparative study in
Anålayo 2011: I 155. The recent interesting study by Jones 2020 presents
this passage on pp. 86–88 without considering the discrepancies with the
Chinese parallel. A comparison with the parallel allows for a more nuanced
evaluation of the position expressed by the Buddha. In fact, especially when
making arguments on early Buddhist thought as a whole, this cannot be
done without relying on all the available versions of a discourse which are
on the same standing as primary sources. Jones 2020: 80 note 3 just
mentions the comparative study by Anålayo 2011: I 147–148 for the initial
section of the discourse, apparently being under the impression that the
parallels are “with no significant differences from the Påli version”.
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‘aggregation’, ‘collection’, ‘pile’, ‘mass’, ‘bundle’, ‘heap’,
‘assemblage’, ‘cluster’, etc. points to the composite, non-unitarian
nature of subjective experience as a whole and literally disaggregates the base for any further metaphysical projection.
For the ancient Indian oral audience of the early discourses,
hearing the word ‘self’ carried, by default and by definition, the
presumption of a (unitary, auto-emanated, etc.) self. It is this
presumption of a specific metaphysical belief and ontological
qualification of the self that is being negated, not the impermanent
and conditioned continuity of phenomena as processes. The
negation also does not deny the possibility of continuity beyond the
present lifetime for such a changing process that does not involve a
self or a soul, nor does it intend to dispense with the agency for
karmic responsibility and the experiencing of the results of
intentional actions.
To the Buddha’s audience the negative prefix an- (as in
English no- or not- self) in anåtman/anattå would convey the sense
of a metaphysical deflation of the Self. Such a project of deontologisation to undermine the status and value of the Self can
rely on a contemplation of the aggregates as impermanent and
incapable of yielding lasting satisfaction. This makes them unfit for
being regarded as an ontologically permanent self (of which they
are indeed void). In fact from the perspective of the Buddha’s
audience the qualification of ‘unchanging’ or ‘lasting’ would have
been implicitly prefixed to the term anåtman or anattå, because by
definition the word åtman/attå referred to something unchanging.
Thus, as a matter of a fact, “the two-word English phrase ‘no self’
becomes ‘no unchanging self’ by definition” (Gombrich 2009: 9).
The chariot illustration spoken by the fully awakened
bhikΣuˆ¥ Íailå enjoyed great fortune in later Buddhist literature,
where it provided canonical source material for the emergence of
innovative doctrinal perspectives and was, at the same time, read
anew in light of these new perspectives on the status of the living
or sentient ‘being’, ‘person’ or ‘individual’ and the aggregates that
took place in intra-Buddhist controversies and also in debates with
non-Buddhist opponents.61 A fascinating facet of this debate in the
61

I look at the reuse of the chariot illustration in the context of these
developments in a separate paper under preparation (in which I also address
the argument by Wynne 2010/2011 that the Vajirå-sutta (SN 10.5)
presupposes a reductionistic as well as realistic position concerning the five
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Mahåyåna traditions concerns the status of the recipients of the
bodhisattva’s compassion, given that beings do not exist in truth
and fact. In these contexts, the simile is often linked to the
innovative constructs (not attested in early Buddhist discourse) of
conventional versus ultimate sense and provisional versus absolute,
which became major interpretive thrusts driving the doctrinal
history of the later Buddhist traditions. Thus the circumstance that
this discourse has been preserved in a number of versions
stemming from distinct traditions of early reciters grants direct
access to a range of canonical bases for the subsequent elaborations
on the chariot simile that arose within various later scholastic
traditions.
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B
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CBETA
D
EÓ
G

A∫guttara-nikåya
Beijing edition (bstan ’gyur dpe bsdur ma)
Cone edition
Chinese Buddhist Electronic Text Association
Derge edition (TØhoku)
Ekottarika-ågama (T 125)
Golden Tanjur edition

aggregates and that this involves a terminological, philosophical and
chronological difference vis-à-vis what he sees as an earlier formulation of
the teaching on the negation of self). A similar course was taken by the
metaphor of the ‘bearer of the burden’ (bhårahåra) in SN 22.22 (translated
in Bodhi 2000: 871–872) at SN III 25,14–26,17, SÓ 73 at T II 19a15–b1
(translated in Frauwallner 1956: 25–28 and Anålayo 2013b: 33–35), EÓ
25.4 at T II 631c11–632a6, SHT IV 30b (reconstructed and translated in
Eltschinger 2014; 456–462) and Up 9023 at D 4094, mngon pa, nyu 85b4 or
P 5595, mngon pa’i bstan bcos, thu 132a7 (translated in Dhammadinnå
2013: 132–134 and HonjØ 2014: II 903–904). This is one of the early texts
most frequently quoted and discussed in controversies over the status of the
person in relation to the five aggregates; see Eltschinger 2014.
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